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INTRODUCTION
Kenya, as  all sub-Saharan African nations,  faces  an urgent need for
increased economic development over the  next two decades.  For  this  to
occur, many technical and institutional processes must take place
simultaneously.  The primary intent of this  paper  is  to review the
potential contribution of the social sciences  in Kenyan institutions of
higher learning, with emphasis on rural social sciences,  to national
economic growth and development.  The basic contention of  this paper is
that the  rural social sciences  provide the  intellectual and analytical base
for contributing  to understanding and policy analysis of  the most
intractable problems presently faced by Kenya and the other  developing
nations of sub-Saharan Africa.  Augmenting indigenous capacity in the rural
social sciences  is a long run effort, but one which will be  of lasting
benefit to  the Nation, the  region, and  the continent.  While much of this
paper applied to  sub-Saharan Africa in general, primary focus  is  on Kenya
and East Africa.
The  central premises  on which this  case  is developed include  (1)
economic development will emphasize improving the living conditions of  low
income people,  (2)  population growth and attendant matters will  (and
should) continue  to  receive a large measure of  attention, (3) economic
development will depend in large measure  on, and will be led by, rural
development, and (4) concepts of the  social sciences  are key to
constructive  debate on fundamental  and controversial questions of
development strategy.
With economic growth, the  entire range of rural economic and social
institutions, ranging from patterns  of production, marketing andconsumption of agricultural products,  to  land and natural resource use,  to
family work and living patterns, will be subject to unprecedented stress,
accompanied by severe and sometimes disruptive change.  The challenge  to
the social  sciences is  to  aid in understanding these processes and
institutions,  thereby contributing to economic development, which
inexorably is accompanied by stress and change.
Economic development  is  far more complex than putting  in place some
combination of capital, skilled labor, and technical and economic
processes.  It requires  such factors  as  entrepreneurship, attitudes,  and
political and social institutions which are conducive to  the changes  and
processed involved in economic development.  For this  reason it  is of
paramount importance that the  entire spectrum of institutions be
understood, that there exist capacity in Kenyan universities  to analyze
and articulate options pertaining to  economic  (and particularly rural
economic) development, and that there be channels to  government policy
making units  for the  transmission of  this knowledge.  This  is  neither to
diminish the role of  technical advance in the physical, biological, and
agricultural sciences, nor  the  role of  sound fiscal, monetary, and
international trade policies.  Rather, the intent is  to  emphasize  the need
for concurrent development of  indigenous  capacity in such disciplines as
sociology, political science, economics,  and agricultural economics  for
purposes of understanding those dimensions of  economic growth, which
relate to  changing institutions associated with economic development.
In examining the fundamentals of the case  for building indigenous
capacity in the rural social  sciences, we first focus on several key
issues:  the  important of attention to  low income people, reducingpopulation growth rates,  agriculture as  the  leading sector, and several
specific examples of perennial fundamental  and controversial issues of
current  debate to which social science can contribute.  We  then review
some characteristics  of the  social sciences  in  East Africa, and conclude
by discussing some constraints, as well as  opportunities  for  its
contribution  to economic  development.
FOCUS ON LOW INCOME PEOPLE
Economic development herein is  taken to  include  the production and
broadened distribution of basic  life sustaining goods and services such as
food, shelter, and health;  increased levels  of living, including provision
of more jobs and attendant higher  incomes, better education, and greater
access to  cultural and humanistic values,  all leading to  greater individual
and national self esteem;  and an expansion in the economic and social
choices available to  individuals  and the nation.1
This  concept of economic development is necessarily oriented toward
addressing the problems  and needs  of growing numbers  of poor people, who
are  largely, though not exclusively, rural.  One practical  implication of
focus on the  income  of the  lower two quintiles of income recipients  is that
use of per capita growth of GNP  as  a measure of economic development  is of
limited value.  This point merits further elaboration.
A narrow focus  on percentage increase  in GNP not only fails  to  address
the  question of  income  distribution, but implicitly gives greater weight
to  incomes accruing to  those in the higher quintiles.2  As  a given
percentage increase in income  to  the lowest quintiles  is compared to  a
smaller base  than the same percentage compared to  the  top quintiles,  the
given percentage increase  to  the lower quintiles, however urgent, may
3appear unimpressive  in terms  of national  income statistics.  For example, a
ten percent increase in income to  the  lower quintiles of population will
show up as a smaller overall increase  in national  income than will a ten
percent increase to  the top quintile.3  Yet, many  if not most, analysts
and policy makers would view a ten percent increase to  the  lower quintiles
of population of greater urgency than a ten percent  increase in income to
the  top quintiles, particularly when the  income  distribution is already
heavily skewed toward the  top quintiles, as  is  the case in most developing
countries.
Critics may contend that emphasis on the lower quintiles of
population reflects an arbitrary value judgement.  However, following the
above line of reasoning, when assessing economic performance on the basis
of percentage growth in GNP in an economy with income skewed toward the
top, not to make such as  explicit value judgement means  that an implicit
value judgement already is being made favoring the  top quintiles  of income
recipients.
Critics may further contend that there  is  no particular merit  in
valuing gains in income to one group as  opposed to  another, or that to
place  greater social welfare weights on a particular segment  of society
involves a degree of "arbitrariness."  A rejoinder to this proposition is
that not to  engage in this  "exercise in arbitrariness,"  is  to,  first,
implicitly favor the top income groups, which is  equally arbitrary;
second, leave unstated the value judgments  of the analyst which are
unrealized by the reader  (and perhaps  even by the analyst!);  and third,
incredibly,  to  forswear what economic  development is  fundamentally about--
improving the conditions of large numbers of poor people!
4If a major national  objective of economic development  is  to  improve
the  conditions of the  lower quintiles of  income recipients,  and
substantial growth  in GNP occurs but does not accrue  in significant
measure  to  the  lower 40 percent, or at least  the  lower 60 percent, this
can scarcely be considered to be economic development  in any meaningful
sense,  or to  represent an increase  in national social welfare.  This  point
is  fundamental, and needs to  be restated.  If greater values, or more
technically, social welfare weights,  are not placed on addressing the
needs  of the poorest of the poor, then, when measuring growth solely in
terms  of percent increase  of GNP,  implicit social welfare weights favor
the  top income recipients, especially when the initial distribution is
already skewed toward the  top.
Growth records with respect to  income  distribution are mixed.  One
study  shows that during the period studies, roughly  1950-70, varying by
nation, economic growth in India, Peru, Panama, the Philippines, and
Mexico had been accompanied by an income distribution increasingly skewed
toward the  top  quintiles.4  In contrast, economic growth in Costa Rica,
Columbia, Sri Lanka,  Iran, Taiwan, and perhaps surprisingly, El  Salvador,
had been accompanied by increased shares of income to  the lower 40
percent  of  income  recipients.
The proposition that economic growth will automatically ensure a
"trickle down" effect has been all but discredited in modern development
literature.  Equally  invalid, however, is  that economic  growth which may
accompany such phenomena as  the Green Revolution automatically favors the
landlord or the higher  income recipients.  Evidence suggests  that the
ultimate beneficiaries, and effect on income distribution of agriculturaldevelopment, depends on the nature of the technical change which brings
about development. 5  There is  a growing consensus  that income distribution
associated with economic growth depends on many factors,  including initial
resource  endowment, and institutional factors such as  taxation and
patterns of government expenditures.
An unequal income distribution results  in part from unequal endowment
of productive assets,  a simple focus on functional distribution of income
(returns to  land, labor and capital) may do little for those who possess
little in the way of valued productive assets.  Clearly, a redistribution
of income is easier and more feasible in a growing economy.  However, it
must be emphasized that such redistribution does not automatically occur
with economic  growth.
Since economic  growth does not ensure a more equal distribution of
income, special attention must be focused on some factors as  the nature of
technical change,  the nature of economic growth, and institutional factors
affecting both economic growth and income distribution.
Another major practical  implication raised in every standard
treatment of income distribution  is  its  relation to  the basic economic
question of "what to produce."  Raising people above absolute poverty will
increase demand for basic items  such as  food, clothing, and shelter, which
can be produced internally, relative to  demand for imported luxury goods,
which attend increased incomes  to  those already at the top of the  income
scale.  Increased effective demand for basic goods required by the modal
citizen generates  incentive for their production.
A  striking aspect of poverty in Africa is  that females appear  to bear
a disproportionately heavy burden of poverty and its  debilitatingconsequences.  By some estimates,  females comprise nearly 50 percent of
the agricultural work force in sub-Saharan Africa.6  In addition, they
bear major responsibility for child rearing and domestic  chores.  To
exacerbate  the  situation, domestic chores  in rural Africa include hard
physical  labor such as  carrying firewood and water, and laboring without
the drudgery saving conveniences of  the modern world.  Thus,  issues  such
as  impact of agricultural technology, poverty, and income distribution,
can ill afford to neglect issues of gender.
Finally, the  sheer magnitude of absolute poverty directs  attention to
the conditions of the  lower quintiles of population.  Of the world's 5
billion people, some  70 percent, or  3.5 billion, live  in developing
countries.  Of these,  between 35 and 40 percent, or 1.2  to  1.4 billion,
are estimated to  live  in absolute poverty, lacking a minimal standard of
food, clothing, shelter.  While the numbers are not known with certainty,
some estimates place  the number of people in absolute poverty at 170
million, or 33  percent in sub-Saharan Africa.7
It  is  to  the credit of  the Government of Kenya that major themes of
several of its  development plans have centered around income
redistribution.  Specifically, these  include "redistribution with growth",
(1970-74 and 1974-78),  "basic needs approach",  (1979-83),  and
"mobilization of domestic resources for equitable development"  (1984-88).8
These  themes reflect official recognition of need for explicit attention
to  income  distribution in the development process.
The fundamental point raised here is  that if  economic development is
to bring forth increased  incomes to  low income  people, understanding the
social and economic  institutions which affect income  distribution isnecessary in order to  make the policy decisions  to bring about these ends.
Specifically, the  nature and results of technical change,  and results of
fiscal policies--systems  of raising revenues, and expenditures on health,
transportation, education, and the like--with respect  to  income
distribution are among those matters which need to  be better understood.
The  rural social sciences provide the  intellectual base  for understanding
and articulating these issues,  and the intellectual leadership  for this
effort must come from within the  nation to be most effective.
EMPHASIS ON REDUCING POPULATION GROWTH RATES
As  if to emphasize the pivotal nature of the  next two decades  in
Africa, two recent reports by international agencies chronicle the urgency
of immediate action on African agriculture and population.  A World Bank
Report9  affirms  that population and family planning programs will be their
number one priority.  This  report represents one of the strongest policy
statements  to date by a major donor organization on the urgency of reducing
the rate of population growth.
A recent  report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the
United Nations  (FAO) focuses on food problems, with emphasis on needed
policy reforms, but also addressed the population issue.1 0  The report
states,  "It  is usual for population growth rates  to  increase at particular
stages of development.  But  in Africa this period of peak growth is
occurring later, at a higher level, and will last longer than  in other
regions.  The growth rates, which now averages  three percent per year, is
the highest  in the world, and  is still  increasing.  The period of peak
growth will not be reached before 1995  in at least  20 African countries."ll
The  report further states,  "The social effects of high growth rates are
8equally severe.  The  increasing demand for social facilities such as
health, schooling, housing, roads,  and transport threatens  to  compromise
previous  successes and to  distort national budgets." 12  The report adds,
"Sustained high population growth rates affect almost every aspect of
African society.  Kenya, for example, will double  its population over the
next 18  years and would have  to expand agricultural production at more
than four percent a year over  the same period just to  keep per capita food
production at  the present  level."1 3
Population growth affects Kenya perhaps even more acutely than sub-
Saharan Africa as  a whole.  The population of Kenya in mid-1985 was  20.59
million, and will certainly double by  the early years of  the 21st century,
regardless of what happens to birth rates between now and then.  Of grave
concern is  that Kenya's population growth rate  is currently estimated at
from 4.1  to 4.3  percent, which ranks with the highest  in the world.  World
Bank projections for Kenya show that,  depending on assumptions of rapid
fertility decline, standard projections,  or slow fertility decline, Kenya
will have a population by the year 2000 of 32.54, 36.46,  or 38.45  million.
By the year 2050, under these assumptions, the projections are 66.2,
96.64, and 128.46 million.14  These numbers portend staggering implications
even under the most optimistic scenarios of food production, as well as  for
provision of the health care, education, jobs, housing, and related
amenities which are  fundamental to  improved living conditions.  It  is
sobering to reflect  that seldom have nations achieved agricultural growth
of over  3.5 percent per year for more than 2 decades.
The inevitability of a Kenyan population approaching 40 million by
the  early part of  the 21st century,  in contrast  to  its current  (early1988)  22 million, stems  from the "population momentum" phenomenon.  This
phenomenon results  from the  fact that even if birth rates decline,
population nevertheless  is destined to  increase in absolute numbers for
some time because of the  large numbers of young people who will reach
child bearing age during the next 20 years.  Kenya in 1985 had a
dependency ratio  (people <15 and >64/people 15-64) of 121, compared to a
ratio  of 95  for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.1 5   (No other sub-Saharan
African nation in 1985 had a dependency ratio of over 110.)  These  large
numbers  of young people who will reach child bearing age  during the next
15  to  20 years virtually guarantee that Kenya's population will increase
at a rate which will strain the  capacity of the Nation to provide the
education, health care, jobs,  and related amenities and services associated
with economic  development and rising expectations.
The net result of the population momentum phenomenon is  that the
leveling off of population in terms  of absolute numbers requires  several
generations of declining, and then stable birth rates.  (Kenya has already
achieved low death rates.)  In other words, the effects of declining birth
rates will take at least several generations to manifest  itself as a
stable population in terms  of absolute numbers.  Further,  it  suggests
that efforts  to  reduce birth rates will show little in the way of results
(in terms of absolute numbers) by the year 2000, but what happens  during
the next decade will have staggering implications by the year 2050.16
Thus, the population momentum phenomenon should not be taken to mean that
effort on reduction of birth rates is  futile or should receive  low
priority.  On the contrary, the delayed reaction of results compels
immediate action.
10The Government of Kenya officially recognizes the gravity of  this
problem, expressing concern in a 1986  report, commonly referred to as
Sessional Paper No.  1.17  The opening sentence  of the report states, "At
the  end of this  century, Kenya will have a population of about  35 million
people,  78  percent more than lived in Kenya in 1984."18  It  is significant
that this  document states  that:  "Perhaps the stiffest challenge  facing
Kenya's people over the  next 15 years  is  to  reduce the size of  their
families so  that the economy can provide adequately for all Kenyans."19
Thus,  official government policy recognizes  the  importance  of reducing
population growth rates.
Effective policy must be based on understanding the social
institutions and related factors which affect birth rates and population
growth.  It is  futile to  attempt to  limit birth rates simply by "promoting
contraceptive use".  While western contraceptive technology may be an aid
in reducing birth rates,  such  "western imposed" practices without an
understanding of cultural values  and incentives  are doomed to  failure.  In
some parts  of the world, among the measures which have been suggested for
strengthening the demand for small families  are improving child health,
expanding education (particularly for women),  improving  the status of
women, including their opportunities  in the economy, and reforming laws
and regulations that affect contraception.  Again, we  see  the  importance
of matters  of  gender.
Indigenous capacity in disciplines, such as  sociology and
anthropology, are an important factor  in understanding the  issues,  and the
implications of various policy measures to  achieve lower birth rates.  If,
for example, additional children are viewed as  "another pair of hands"
11which produce more than they consume, and who are seen as  "social
insurance"  for old age, policies  of "education",  or of "making
contraceptives available",  are not likely to have any significant effect
on reducing birth rates.  In contrast, if with increasing incomes,
families, and particularly mothers, begin to perceive other options  for
themselves and their children with smaller families, a given policy may
have quite a different effect.  Thus,  it  is necessary to understand the
incentives  for large numbers  of children in terms of cultural heritage.
Tied to  the population issue  is  the matter of rural to  urban
migration.  In Kenya, as  in most developing nations, urban populations
have grown relative to  rural population, although 80 percent of Kenya's
population is  still rural.  Nevertheless, a policy of "keeping people on
the farm" while having some appeal, also poses problems.  The most
productive areas of Kenya are already heavily populated, and the pressure
on highly productive land is  intense.  Of Kenya's  total land area of
580,000  square kilometers, only 20 percent is  characterized as high or
medium potential. 20  In 1965,  there were  .7  hectares  of high potential
land per person in Kenya.  Presently, there  is  .49 hectare of land per
person, and it  is estimated that there will be only  .2  hectare  in 1990.
Although some  350,000 hectares of land is estimated to be potentially
irrigable,  this can only be done with high capital investment.2 1
As population increases,  there  is more intense pressure on more
marginal, semi-arid lands,  the ecology of which is very fragile.  As
pressure becomes more intense, problems  such as overgrazing, deforestation
and shortage of fuelwood, and soil erosion inexorably become more
intractable. 2 2
12Moving people from overpopulated rural areas, to  overpopulated cities
places  strains on its  infrastructure--streets and roads, water supply,
waste disposal, etc.,  but keeping them in rural areas adds  to pressure on
fragile ecological systems.  Thus, a great deal of potential economic gain
for individuals rests on attaining a population growth rate  consistent
with the nation's  capacity to  provide for it.
As put succinctly by Galbraith some  25  years ago,  "It  is pointless to
urge a population policy if overpopulation is not the problem, but all
other gains can obviously be annulled  if overpopulation  is  the problem."23
Donor organizations can lend assistance in the form of technology,
financing, and to  some extent  (perhaps limited) of personnel.  But again,
the intellectual base for understanding problems  and articulating issues
must emanate from indigenous leadership, just as  successful working
programs must be planned, organized, and implemented primarily by
indigenous personnel who are familiar with the people and the customs  and
incentives which motivate  them.
AGRICULTURE AS  THE LEADING SECTOR
During the last 2 decades, scholars  in economic development have de-
emphasized the leading role of industrialization which had been in vogue
during the  1950s and 60s.  During that period, increased agricultural
production was  seen as  playing a passive role,  serving mainly  to release
workers necessary for  increased industrialization.24
Current thinking emphasized agricultural development as  a more active
stimulus to  agricultural income.  This has  direct beneficial effects.
First, increased agricultural income has a direct and immediate beneficial
effect on people  in the  lower quintiles of  income distribution, as  a large
13percentage of the poor are rural, and engaged in agricultural production.
Second, increased agricultural income  is  seen to  increase the  demand
for products produced by the  informal  sector, such as  simple hand tools,
furniture, household goods, and construction.  This  acts not only directly
to  increase  income in the rural informal sector, but possibly as  a means
to help stem rural-to-urban migration.
The FAO report cited above  gives strong emphasis to  agricultural
development in Africa as a crucial requirement for future growth.  The
Government of Kenya, through Sessional Paper No.  1.,  also cited above,
explicitly recognizes  the importance  of the agricultural sector,  and
particularly,  the necessary contributions  of small farmers.  The report
focuses on seven essential commodities:  coffee and tea for  improving farm
incomes and as a source of export earnings;  maize, wheat, milk, and meat
(beef and poultry, mainly) for food security;  and horticultural crops  for
both export and home consumption.  The  report also cites land use issues
as  including both the possible underutilization of large tracts, and the
overdivision of lands  into tracts which are  too small for efficient
production.
Of significance here  is that  the leading role envisioned for  the
rural sector in Kenyan economic development over  the next two decades will
place a high premium on understanding those aspects  of agriculture in the
domain of the  rural social sciences.  Land use, family work patterns,
family size and labor force, technical change, backward linkages  to  the
farm input sector and forward linkages to  marketing activities will all
merit continuing attention.
Focus  on agriculture and the rural sector  implies  that more attention
14needs  to be placed on improving the rural infrastructure.  Better roads,
more reliable water supply and sewage  systems  in rural towns,  and better
access  to health care and such amenities not only serve  to  directly improve
the welfare of rural people, and lead to  increased production, but serve to
diminish the  incentive for rural  to urban migration.  Recent strategy by
the Government of Kenya, popularly known as  "district focus",  is  consistent
with this  theme. 25
While the  role of new technology in agricultural change  is  not to be
diminished, it  is  important  to bear in mind that certain institutional
changes  are necessary for agricultural development to  occur.  Credit,
extension, research, and marketing institutions will undergo change.  For
example,  as  economic development occurs, and incomes increase, there will
be a greater demand for meat and other livestock products.  This will
require a changing mix of inputs,  as well as  changing marketing
institutions, not to mention the  changing requirements  for research,
education, and extension services.  Cereals and other crops will tend to
be used more as  feed for livestock, and less  for direct human consumption,
again requiring changes  in marketing channels, and requirements  for
information and technical  services.26  Crops such as  oilseeds may acquire
increasing  importance for their byproducts, such as  oilseed cake  for dairy
feed.27
A major challenge facing many countries in their planning  is  the
development of a well organized marketing system capable of accurately
reflecting changes in supply, demand, and production relationships.  For
example,  in Kenya, the  recent deregulation of beef at the retail  level is
intended to  raise producer prices,  and increase  incentives  to  the  farmer.
15However, for this  to  occur, the marketing system must efficiently reflect
increases prices back to  farmers.  Lack of market  information and
monopsonistic buyers  inhibit efficient transmission of price signals.  The
design of efficient markets  is yet another basic, but urgent and
fundamental task to which social scientists can contribute.
With all  the compelling arguments for agriculture as  the leading
sector in economic  development, it  is  ironic that many developing
economies penalize their agriculture, while industrial nations subsidize
theirs. 28  Social scientists by themselves  cannot solve this problem.  But
certainly, an articulate cadre of indigenous  social scientists,
particularly agricultural economists in this case, can be an intellectual
force  for focusing on these important issues.
SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS AS  THE
KEY TO CONTROVERSIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
A wide range  of development issues  deals directly with concepts  in
the purview of social scientists.  Let us  review a small sample of what
could be a virtually inexhaustible list.
Natural Resource Issues
The limited land resources, and the environmental pressures of an
increasing population, inevitably lead to conflicts and the question of
competition for available  land and natural resources.  Basic and
fundamental concepts of social science often are key to  analysis of  these
problems.  An example  is  the use  of land surrounding Amboselli National
Park, a major game reserve and international tourist attraction responsible
for significant foreign exchange earnings.  The land surrounding the park,
16when left  in its natural state, contributes  to productivity of game  in the
park.  However, leaving land in  its natural  state precludes  food production
which could be obtained by more intensive cultivation.
This problem will be recognized as  a classic example  of external
costs and benefits.  If the benefits of  increased game production are not
reflected back to  the  landowner, he has  no  incentive  to  take such benefits
into account.  Proper analysis of  the problem, recognizing the external
nature of the  costs and benefits, suggests the possibility of innovative
methods of compensation  to farmers  to  use the land for grazing instead of
cultivation, allowing its contribution to  productivity of the game
reserve.  While the actual policy prescription may be more complex in
practice than in theory, the  point here  is  that in the absence  of the
correct theoretical formulation of this  problem--explicitly recognizing
the externalities involved--rational  solution on a practical level is
impossible.  Alternatives  in economic development, particularly  those
involving natural resource policy issues,  are rife with problems of this
nature.  Concepts fundamental to  social science often are useful in their
analysis.
Strategies for Development
A subject of continuing urgency and debate is  that of the strategy
best  suited for propelling a nation to higher levels of development.  In
particular, the strategy of an "inward looking" import substitution
strategy, as  opposed to  an "outward looking" export oriented strategy, is
the  focus of continuing debate in developing nations.
Typically, institutions such as  the World Bank and the  International
Monetary Fund  (IMF) promote  an export oriented strategy, often tying
17economic  assistance to  measures such as  devaluation of currencies and
tighter monetary and fiscal  policies, particularly if the  recipient has
existing or potential inflation.  This strategy is not generally  in accord
with more inward looking strategies favored by African nations as
expressed in the  "Lagos  Plan of Action".29  Such policies recommended by
the World Bank and the IMF often conflict with those preferred by
Africans, and are seen by some  as pernicious, actually preventing African
nations from "catching up".
While a certain amount of criticism of international  institutions can
be dismissed as  the product of political rhetoric and press
sensationalism,  it seems  fair to  say that the notion that policies such as
devaluation are  "against a nation's best interests"  are accepted as
conventional wisdom by a substantial share of the African public.  I cite
an example from my own experience  in  teaching agricultural economics at
the University of Nairobi.  One of  the objectives of my courses, both at
the graduate and the undergraduate level, was to  introduce the student to
factors affecting exchange rates, effects of changes  in exchange rates,
and some consequences of fixed, and especially of overvalued, exchange
rates,  as  these are symptomatic of many Third World nations.
My objective,  of course, was  not to  promote devaluation, but to  teach
students  to think through consequences, and likely effects of
alternatives, for they must be able to  cut through the rhetoric  and the
slogans  if they are  to be of assistance in making the decisions on which
Africa's future depends.
As  lon'g  as  I used neutral  (to Africans) examples, such as  dollar-yen
relationships, students  seemed to  grasp the concepts with ease comparable
18to any  students in my past experience.  However, when using examples of
African currencies,  it was  slower going.  Students  immediately saw the
increased prices  of imports,  and the  deterioration of the  terms of  trade
which would result from devaluation.  However, they resisted the  notion
that an overvalued exchange rate discriminated against producers of
exports,  found it hard to  see  the possible effect of price in rationing
available  foreign exchange, and almost uniformly believed that little or
no good could possibly result from a lower valued currency.  I believe
this  to be  the result of prior conditioning and exposure  to popular
rhetoric.  Even the empirical example of Japan resisting further
strengthening of  the dollar against  the yen, and the paradox of Africans
insisting on going  the other way, was met with skepticism.  There must be
a catch somewhere.
While a case can be  made for  inward looking development strategies,
it must be based on economic fundamentals  such as  comparative advantage,
existing and potential, and long run costs.  At the very least,  if
Africans are to  debate with the World Bank and other donor organizations
on such issues  as trade and exchange rate strategies, the fundamental
issues  involved must be understood.  It  is  impossible to  conduct
significant policy discussions if there  is not  general agreement of how an
overvalued exchange rate affects exporters, or how a realistic exchange
rate  serves to  ration foreign exchange.  As has been asserted by Ruttan,
"The effectiveness  of economic assistance is  influenced by the degree of
convergence  in the views  of donor and recipient countries concerning the
latter's economic policies...  A  convergence of views  of the  recipient's
economic policy can occur only in the context of donor-recipient
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expense of producers, and manufacturers using important  inputs at  the
expense of manufacturers using indigenous  resources, it  should be
recognized as such.  From this point, constructive debate for decision
making can begin.
The issue here, of course,  is not which strategy Africans should
follow.  It is,  rather, that  it  is  imperative  that an indigenous cadre of
social scientists be well versed on these  issues.  If, as many believe,
the ultimate answer for Africa is a combination of inward and outward
looking actions, such as  through customs unions and preferential trade
areas  (PTA's),  this  even more strongly supports  the need for expertise in
these matters.  Problems of identifying the  industries  to emphasize,
external barriers, mutually consistent exchange rates, and the host of
difficult problems that must be solved if a PTA is  to  successfully emerge
will require significant indigenous  capacity in these areas. 31
We might remind ourselves that although Kenya's exchange rate may be
over-valued, it  is not over-valued by much in comparison with many other
African currencies. 32   Relatively realistic  exchange rates,  in comparison
to other African nations, must certainly be among the factors contributing
to Kenya's economic success and attractiveness  as a tourist mecca.  It
would be poetic justice if some of my more skeptical Kenyan students were
one day to be  in a position, for example  in negotiations on intra-African
trade,  to urge their African neighbors to  adopt more realistic exchange
rates.
20The Free Market-Central Planning Mix
Developing countries, more  so  than developed, for which the  pattern
has been set and changes  tend to be marginal, are  faced with decisions
regarding fundamental organization of  their economies.  While polar
rhetoric exists on some occasion (in developed countries  as well as
developing),  the practical choice  is  in selecting that mix of government
responsibility and decentralized market incentives most appropriate--that
is--what works!
One reason why Kenya's economic performance has outstripped most
other African nations  is  that  it has adopted a pragmatic mix of capitalism
tempered with government responsibility.  As the performance of socialist
oriented economies in Africa continues  to  prove disappointing, one can
expect that they will move toward a more pragmatic mix, making greater use
of the price and market system.  In this,  the  usual distinctions between
public and private goods, and problems having associated external  costs
and benefits, serve as useful starting points for separating what is
logically the economic responsibility of the public and private  sectors.
Caution is  required, however.  Even in the most free market oriented
developing economy, the American experience cannot wisely be uncritically
duplicated.  For example, a small nation simply does not have  the market
size  to promote a large number of competing firms with significant
economies  of scale  to  allow for effective price competition.  Hence,  the
role of  the state in curbing monopolistic pricing practices will
necessarily be larger in such countries.  (This is  another argument for a
preferential trade area which would enable larger markets  to  allow both
economies of scale, and healthy price  competition, thus  reducing the  role
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made through the price and market system, the role of government can be
oriented toward other functions.  Thus,  the objective  is not to minimize
the economic  role of the  state, but to use  the  limited resources  of the
state for  those functions best left to  government, and which promote
economic development, such as building the public infrastructure, which
itself fosters external  economies of the private sector.  Excessive use of
scarce government planning resources for price  regulation and such matters
which could be handled by private markets, detracts from attention to  the
matters requiring government attention.  Unfortunately, the burden in
economic development generally is  greatest for those governments most
lacking in resources.
Galbraith offers several  trenchant observations  on economic
organization relating developing countries.3 3  Capitalism, and western
style capitalism in particular, offers,  in addition to  the usual benefits
of free markets and fluctuating prices which act as a rationing and
allocative mechanism, the  prospect of foreign aid in the form of capital
and technical  assistance from other capitalistic nations;  an agricultural
system based primarily on market principles and private ownership of land;
and a political system with an emphasis on the importance of the
individual and economic  incentives, and economic and personal freedoms.
In contrast, socialistic rhetoric after the Marxist pattern,
emphasizes  the  "neo-colonialist" nature of capitalism, and the alleged
dependence on the developed world.  The  socialist alternative suggests  a
direct, frontal attack on institutions which are seen to be retarding to
economic development.  To  the extent  that existing patterns of
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"imperialist",  "neo-colonialist", or  in other ways,  retarding the
opportunities of  the modal citizen, the  socialist solution which promises
to  destroy these  institutions and focus on income distribution often has a
seductive appeal.  The price of  this, however, is  the stifling of
incentives  and production enabled by the market mechanism, denial of the
allocative mechanism inherent in freely moving prices, and discouragement
of capital  investment.  A further cost of  the socialistic  solution is  that
the heavy central planning required by a government places an unrealistic
and impossible burden on scarce planning resources, diverting effort from
legitimate role of government, such as  education and schools,
transportation, roads, highways, bridges, water resources and environment,
and health.
As  the grim truth that African economies which have attempted the
socialist experiment are not well suited for centrally planned models
becomes more evident, we can expect that such governments will back away
from a dogmatic stance, and that future  decisions will be more pragmatic
than theological.  Those nations selecting a more pragmatic mix, such as
Kenya and Ivory Coast, and which have fared much better  than their
neighbors, can serve  as both example and inspiration to other African
economies.
Greater reliance on the  market system in developing countries neither
eliminates nor minimizes  the role of the  state,  nor diminishes  the need
for planning per se.  It merely changes  the  focus  of government effort, as
greater reliance on the price system  is perfectly consistent with
planning.  Government will still have much to  do.  A  strong cadre  of
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will at  some point be involved in advising government, can be of
tremendous assistance to  developing nations  in selecting that proper mix
of capitalism and socialism, or more specifically, that mix of the  price
and market system, and government direction, which will work for the
development  of  Africa.
Finally, in this,  there is  a lesson for donor organizations and donor
nations, particularly those such as  the U.S. which appear overly
preoccupied with economic organization and the  rhetoric of developing
nations.  First,  to  the  extent that socialism suggests a frontal attack on
what are viewed to be retarding institutions, and unequal distribution of
resources and income,  the United States must place itself squarely on the
side of legitimate reform--policies which address the needs of the modal
citizen and which emphasize  individual  economic opportunities and
reasonable distribution of economic resources and income.  The U.S. is
well advised to  play to  the best features of Western style democracy,
driving its  foreign policy by a decidedly pro-democracy rather than an
anti-communist stance.
Second, in moving away from unsuccessful socialist experiments,  the
rhetoric  of developing nations may lag behind.  Nations may feel compelled
to proclaim that they  "have not abandoned socialist principles".  This  is
human nature, as  failure  is not readily admitted.  In this, we can learn
from the nature of political controversy in the  U.S.,  where the largest
beneficiaries of federal programs often are among the most vehement in
their denunciation and disavowal of  "socialism".  The lesson is  that we
would be well served to  pay more attention to what governments of
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expect that Africans ultimately will adopt  "what works".  And, of course,
"what works" for Africa will be,  in the long run, in the best interests  of
the  developed world as  well.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN AFRICA
It  is beyond the  scope of  this paper to review the  evaluation and
organization of the social sciences  in East Africa, or  even Kenya.  The
intent here  is merely to draw from contributions of others  some essential
features of social sciences  in Africa which may bear on  their effectiveness
to  contribute to  economic development.  We will then combine  these features
with observations based on my personal experience as a visiting professor
at the University of Nairobi to  reflect on some  "bread and butter"  issues
which may have implications  for future effectiveness of the  rural social
sciences in contributing to  economic development.
The question of the  relationship between the social sciences and
development in Africa is  indeed not a simple one.  In the worlds of one
author,  in the post World War II  era,  "Development was conceptualized as a
particular kind of change reflected in capitalist industrialization and
the replication of institutions  characteristic of Western capitalist
industrial societies,  even though such societies differed in their  social
organizations and structures." 34  He  further observes that if African
societies were to become like the West, then it might be assumed that  the
role of African social science was  to  facilitate this  replicative process,
and further observes  that this  formulation has been subjected to  serious
questioning, there being skepticism about the appropriateness  of African
Social Science, based on "an analysis of much of contemporary African
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bourgeois Western social science." 35  He adds that  it cannot be too
readily assumed that African social science  is an agent  and catalyst of
development, that the institutionalization of social science  is  a part of
economic development, and the character of the development process will
have a bearing on the character of African social science.
The relevance of the European-North American capitalistic "bias" of
Africans receiving their graduate education in Europe and North America is
a question which commonly arises.  Many argue that a broader perspective,
including a Marxist perspective,  is necessary to chart alternative courses
of development.  Suffice  it  to say  for now that this  is  one feature,  or to
put it more strongly, a source of tension in African social science.  It
would seem, however, this  could be a constructive source  of tension, for
the practical task viz a viz  the capitalism-socialism controversy  is  to
select what works, i.e.,  that combination of prices and markets, and
central direction, which will best enable African nations  to  get on with
the urgent task of economic development!
Court identifies  several  "sources of cleavage" in  the East African
social  sciences. 36   Included among them are:  (1) a "generation gap"
between the older or first generation (after independence)  social
scientists  trained mostly in the U.K.,  and more recent social  scientists
who were  trained in North America, (2) "intellectual concentration versus
practical involvement", which may be "eternal and universal",  but which is
intensified in a context  of urgent developmental process  such as prevails
in East Africa,  (3)  "scholarly detachment versus practical policy
involvement";  to what extent do  (or should) African social scientists
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as  opposed to  research further removed from immediate concerns?  and (4)
"nationalism versus  internationalism".  This cleavage stems  from the  fact
that although having attained their professional credentials at British
and North American universities, they retain a strong desire  to  formulate
research along nationalistic lines,  and attempt a "problem" rather than a
"disciplinary" orientation.
Perhaps  above all, we need note,  as we are reminded by Court, the
recent evolvement  of African social  scientists.  "In East Africa,  the  idea
of social  science has  in the  space of  15 years  taken tangible shape
through  the foundation of university departments,  the  emergence of an
indigenous  community of  scholars as  the production of an impressive volume
of writing on East African Society". 37  Further,  "the most visible
achievement of East African social science has been the expansion and
Africanization of social science departments.  They have  in the space of
ten years  developed from small expatriate dominated enclaves  into major
university departments with a fragmentary expatriate component." 38  And
certainly, a review of African social science literature bears a steadily
increasing proportion of African authors.
With this,  let us leave such philosophical and weighty  issues as  the
appropriateness  of the  "Eurocentric bias"  for another day, and review some
constraints based on my experience and observation which  inhibit the
contribution of indigenous  social science  to  contribute to  economic
development.  The underlying assumption used here is  that although social
science may not be the  force for replicating institutions of Western
culture or  for providing direct and immediately applicable  "correct"
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provides  the  intellectual foundation for understanding a broad range of
development issues.  As  such, an articulate cadre of people is  a valuable,
if not indispensable resource for posing appropriate questions,  for adding
a crucial dimension to  the  education for the  next generations of the
nations  leaders, and as  a potential  source of understanding,  if not direct
solution, of issues of direct policy relevance.
CURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON THE RURAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE  IN KENYAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
Some of  the constraints which currently limit the contributions which
the rural social sciences  are capable of making include  the  following:
1.  Heavy teaching loads.  Because of large student numbers and class
size, a disproportionately large portion of university staff members'  time
is  devoted to  teaching.  Lack of  support facilities, such as  teaching
assistants, teaching materials, and duplicating facilities, exacerbates
the problem.  Kenya's current demographic structure, with its  large
population under the age of 15,  suggests  continued high intake of
students.  There is  a shortage of foreign exchange for obtaining
textbooks.  More fundamental  is  the shortage of indigenous  teaching
materials, such as textbooks written by and for Africans.  As noted
earlier, the increasing volume of research on Africa, authored
increasingly by Africans, provides  encouragement and assurance  that
indigenous teaching materials will become more abundant.  The  obvious need
for such materials, high publishing costs and small  (by relative
standards) markets, imply that the support of indigenous  teaching
materials may be a  fruitful area of support by donor organizations.
282.  Low research budgets.  Research budgets  for colleges of
agriculture and for departments such as  economics and sociology lack a
stable and assured funding base.  Some support is  afforded to various
projects by domestic and donor organizations.  Nevertheless,  there  is merit
to  the suggestion that a stable base, however minimal, be established and
funded on a continuing basis.  Additional funds obtained from donor, or
other  sources, would then be  in addition to  an established research
program.  While social scientists have been in some measure used by, or
assimilated into  government in East Africa, faith in social scientists  does
not seem  to have been matched by faith in social science,  if government
support  for research  in university programs  is used as  an indicator.
3.  Low salaries  and rigid promotional structure.  The  structure of
university departments  is  such that there  is  "limited room at the  top".
There exist a very small number of openings  for full professors.  Salaries
tend to be  low, relative  to alternative  sources of employment, and
promotions come very slowly.  Therefore, research which may lead to
publications, and an established academic reputation,  is perceived to have
benefits which are uncertain and distant, while the  need to meet
expenditures for family needs  is  immediate.  As  with any endeavor which
holds  distant,  future benefits of uncertain magnitude, relative  to  another
endeavor which offers certain and immediate benefits,  the activity yielding
future benefits will receive relatively short shrift.  Thus  the  incentive
is  to  engage in short term, relatively well paid consultantships, when they
are available.  This is  simply rational behavior.  While work of academic
value may arise form such consultantships, most observers believe it best
29that consultantships arise out of an academic research program, rather than
the other way around.
4.  Excessive turnover of personnel.  The relatively low salary
structure  of Kenyan universities tends  to  promote an incentive for staff
members to move  to  international organizations such as  the World Bank, FAO,
and others,  as  such opportunities arise, and arise  they do!  While some
turnover  is  expected in any academic organization, it  is not in the  best
interest of that organization to be  composed of individuals who are
willing, or even anxious,  to  leave at  the first attractive opportunity.
The point is  that there must exist incentives  for top senior, and
promising junior staff, to  stay on.  Court estimates that of 40  Ph.D.s in
economics financed by the Rockefeller Foundation between 1963-67,  about 20
percent are still at universities in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as  of
1979. 39  This suggests  that such personnel are valued outside academia,
and that the investment  in human capital was sound.  But it  also raises
the questions on development and continuity of academic programs  and
developing senior African scholars with established reputations.
The foregoing has dire  implications for the contributions of the
rural  social sciences to  the process  of economic development.  The
perceived lack of incentives,  as well as opportunities,  for undertaking
long term research programs  does not auger well for the  future development
of intellectual leaders  in the academic community.  One can ask "whence
will come the  senior academic leaders with established reputations, who
will lead the development of curriculum, who will lead research effort,
who will from a detached position outside of government advise on public
policy, and who will participate in the international dialogue on  issues
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personnel for  these purposes  is  among the more severe consequences of  the
current dilemma.  It also suggests  areas of possible donor  support.
5.  The impending crisis  in staffing.  A more immediate question is
"whence will come the staff  to teach the students during the coming five
years?"  The dearth of new Ph.D.s  in the  pipeline portends a crisis in the
near term.  The Rockefeller Program, which was instrumental  in staffing
many departments during the  1960s and 70s, has ended, and there is nothing
on the horizon to  replace  it.  While many departments now have excellent
Masters  level programs, capacity for training Ph.D.s  is  lacking, and will
be in the foreseeable future.
6.  The  academic-policy link.  African social scientists,  in my
experience, often lament the  lack of access to  the policy making process.
On first impression, the  "visiting  Westerner" is  tempted to dismiss  this
as  only typical of the more  or less universal lament, certainly not
limited to Africa, that policy recommendations based on research so  often
seem to  fall on deaf ears.  However, upon further reflection, and
experience, one comes  to believe  that,  indeed, in Africa the  links between
academic  research and policy making are not well developed, or perhaps
more correctly, are more  indirect than in the U.S.,  for example.  In the
U.S.,  Hatch Act funding for research, close ties between the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and Colleges of Agriculture, the  "Land Grant
Tradition" in general, and numerous  interactions between policy makers and
academic personnel, such as  legislative internships  and government-
academic exchange programs for personnel provide rather direct channels
for research results to  flow to  government, however  imperfect and
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academic departments  and policy making tends  to be more indirect.
Academic research  and personnel, for example, may provide backup to  donor
organizations  to  initiate or  fund a project or program, which in turn
furthers a pre-determined policy of the host government.  Of course,  one
must bear  in mind that it  takes time  to establish these connections--
never an easy process.  The African nations  are relatively young and
cannot be expected to accomplish this  instantaneously.  Yet, one must
emphasize the need to  forge these links in order to maximize the policy
impact of limited academic resources.
Of immediate concern is  the tenuous balance between available and
required senior staff  in many departments.  In the University of Nairobi's
agriculture economics department, for example,  two senior positions are
temporarily staffed by M.S. holders.  Another position is  filled by an
expatriate from India on a temporary basis.  Only one potential Ph.D.  is
in training abroad, and is anticipated back.  Clearly, if even one or  two
senior staff members would resign, or accept a position at an expanding
institution, such as  Egerton University  for example,  the department would
be severely stressed, if not in a complete crisis situation.  Clearly,
such a delicate balance is  not conducive to  the ongoing research
activities which are so  essential for departmental strength and
effectiveness in policy assistance.
Exacerbating the situation is  the increasing numbers of students on
the horizon.  With the possibility of sudden attribution of staff, it  is
unrealistic to  label this situation anything but  "impeding crisis".
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Some opportunities  for a strengthened program in the  social sciences
might include  the following:
1.  A base of funding for research and information dissemination.
A few topics  in a potentially long list might  include:
- Impact of new agricultural technology on family time allocation,
income, and living patterns.
- Fiscal, Monetary, and international trade policy as  it  affects
agriculture.
- Improving the  rural infrastructure and its  effect on rural-urban
migration.
- Economics of agricultural production, storage and marketing.
- Land and natural  resource policy, including relation to production
and conservation of natural resources.
Obviously, the  list could be long, and even under the  most optimistic
scenario, not all could be accomplished.  Research programs need to be
concentrated on key developmental issues.
2.  Developing means of communication and/or networking.  In many
African universities, there  is  a lack of "critical mass" which is
necessary to  develop and maintain the professional edge.  It simply  is
impossible  to keep current if a graduate program is non-existent, and if
there are  too few professional colleagues with which to  confer.  At the
University of Nairobi, the African institution with which I am most
familiar,  this  is  less  of a problem.  But at many institutions throughout
Africa  it  is  a problem.  One means of overcoming the problem is
development of networks  such as  the very productive and successful East
and Southern African Macroeconomics Network supported by the International
Development Research Center  (IDRC),  and the Pan-African Agricultural
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Institute for Agricultural Development.  If Africans are  to achieve their
full contribution, they simply must be  given the opportunity to develop as
professionals, and networking may be an efficient way to achieve  this.
3.  Developing a tradition of providing timely information useful to
farmers and policy makers.  This might take the form of periodic reports on
research, or shorter analyses of prices, problems, or policies relating to
major commodities.  It might further take the form of annual outlook
reports based on available information.  It would be useful to  further
develop working relationships with the Ministry of Agriculture  and other
key agencies of government.  This is not to  suggest duplication, or  that
the University should become a research arm of government.  It does
suggest, however, that better use might be made of existing information.
4.  Developing new sources  of support staff.  It may be possible to
make greater use of lower cost, but well trained graduate, and even
undergraduate assistants,  for some teaching functions.  Insofar as  classes
are large, and support facilities  are scarce, it seems that graduate
assistants could conduct "help sessions", as  well as  assist in
administering examinations.  This would not only provide low cost
assistance to senior staff, but would be valuable experience for  students
who may be  interested in pursuing advanced study.  At many  institutions in
the U.S.,  undergraduates of advanced standing are hired for
responsibilities  such as  grading homework assignments  for beginning level
courses.  This enables more intensive instruction of students, and is  of
direct benefit to  undergraduates  so employed.
345.  Development of indigenous  teaching materials.  While  the volume of
indigenous  research and teaching materials written by Africans has
increased dramatically during the past decade, much remains to be done.
While  the  limited size of the market,  and the  large teaching loads,
mitigate against  such development, there must exist innovative ways of
overcoming these barriers.  This may be a cost-effective area of donor
support.
6.  Programs  to create  incentives  for promising mid-career professors
to  remain with the university in academic positions.  This may require
measures  such as  "salary topping",  and provision of opportunities  to
periodically study or conduct collaborative research abroad.
These activities would clearly  involve some short run costs to  the
nation.  Yet, the potential payoff in terms  of building  institutional
capacity are potentially very high, and these possibilities may provide
attractive and interesting items for potential funding by donor
organizations.
COMPENSATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
As with the problems of economic development in Africa, the problems
under which social scientists  labor in Africa are legion.  But there are
some unique and exciting opportunities available  to  the  African social
scientist as well, and it  would be  remiss not to  specifically note them.
In the developed nations, basic decisions regarding fundamental
economic organization have been made long ago.  While American social
scientists produce work which often has  direct policy application, with
rare  exception, contributions in the policy arena tend to  suggest no more
than marginal change.
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departments has been set,  and change again tends  to be marginal.  Basic
textbooks have been written, with revisions numbering in the double
digits.  The marginal contribution of yet another American textbook on
intermediate microeconomic theory, or principles of agricultural
marketing, must certainly be minuscule, as  there already are many fine
examples  of  such  works.
By way of contrast, Africans are engaged in the deadly serious  task
of economic development and nation building.  The well-educated,
industrious  African social scientist has  the opportunity to  contribute to
decisions which can affect,  for good or  ill,  the course of events  of
national  institutions in a way that simply is not open to his/her North
American or European counterpart.  Certainly, this must be an exciting and
inspiring opportunity and responsibility--to be in position to so
profoundly shape  the form of an academic department, to provide the
information on which pricing policy will be made, or  to  shape and form the
questions which will provide  the basis for planning policies.
Not only would the opportunities  for the African social scientist for
contribution to  public policies be abundant, but the opportunities  for
individual professional development as  well.  The basic text materials on
numerous subjects  in Africa have yet to be written, waiting only for the
African scholar to  put it  to the pen.  While the marginal contribution of
another text on farm management would be of little value to  the American
student, such a text, based on established principles, but using
distinctly Kenyan applications, would be of enormous value to Kenyan
students.  The same would be said of agricultural marketing, pricing and
36trade policies  of coffee and tea, and many other topics.
This  is  not  to  imply that policy makers  in Africa are always
anxiously awaiting the  advice of social scientists.  I nevertheless assert
that the opportunities, and the need, for African social scientists  to
contribute to  economic development are legion, notwithstanding a perceived
reluctance of policy makers  to  seek such counsel.
We noted the limitations  of time  for research and writing, and
limited resources  of Kenyan educational institutions.  Yet, too much can
be made of  these limitations.  Resources  of Kenyan educational
institutions  are not limited to national  resources, but consist of
potential assistance of the donor community as  well.  These  resources can
be tapped for assistance  in developing course materials, and perhaps  in
subsidizing the  cost of production of  low cost materials.  Often, much can
be done at a surprisingly modest cost.
Thus, unique opportunities exist  for  the contribution of African
scholars to  national economic development, as  well as  for individual
professional contribution,  in "Africanization" of existing knowledge and
synthesizing and authoring basic works which can serve as a basis for
future students.
As Galbraith has noted in a related context,  "The advantages of late
arrival are all too few.  Those that exist should be exploited."4 1
Training of African Social Scientists
Let us  conclude with a note on the training of African social
scientists,  emphasizing agricultural economics, the  field with which I am
most familiar.
Many African academic departments now have programs at  the masters
37level which are well recognized.4 2  Based on my experience, I would not
only affirm the validity of such programs, but add that they have some
notable strengths.  In particular, virtually all students write their
thesis projects  using primary data derived from field interviews.  In
contrast, most graduate students  in agricultural economics  in programs
with which I am familiar  in American universities, use secondary data, and
never attain the valuable field interviewing experiences.
African masters  level programs have come far  in the last decade, and
some  institutions have begun Ph.D. programs.  However, even as  Ph.D.
programs  develop in Africa, it would be unrealistic to rely on African
"self-sufficiency" in Ph.D. training.  It  seems realistic  to expect a
substantial  share of the new Ph.D.s to  staff African institutions to have
received their advanced degrees from abroad.
What are  the special responsibilities  and considerations which North
American and European programs have  for African students, particularly at
the Ph.D.  level?  Over two decades ago, Ruttan and Weisblat asserted with
respect to Asian students  in agricultural economics,  "Too little emphasis
has been placed on preparing agricultural economists from abroad for work
on problems of national significance, to  giving them training in macro-
economic  theory, including its  rigorous quantitative application in the
fields of demand, supply, and resource utilization.  We do not suggest
that the Asian student avoid micro-economic studies.  But he does need a
sufficient grounding in macro-economic theory to  enable him to organize
micro-economic studies which will contribute  to knowledge needed for the
development of agricultural policy."4 3
This advice,  rendered in 1965, could as  well be directed toward the
38training of African agricultural economists  in 1988.  Further, I would
emphasize the  importance of setting the  research  topic  in the appropriate
theoretical framework.  The most advanced quantitative  technique is
mischievous--even pernicious--if the  fundamental economic concept is
missed.  This mischief is  exacerbated if the  analyst perceives
professional reward in accordance with complexity of technique employed.44
While the tendency to  carry around a tool in search of a problem on which
to use  it  is  not unique  to young African scholars, Africa can ill-afford
to  squander its best talent on such exercises in futility, while more
fundamental, urgent, and perennial  issues of economic  development beg  for
attention.
Such fundamental  issues  include  those discussed earlier, and others:
the efficacy of food crops versus cash crops;  the real cost of self-
sufficiency in a given product;  import substitution versus export oriented
development strategies;  issues  to be  resolved and conditions  to be met for
development of PTA's,  enabling expanded markets,  economies of  scale, and
more efficient regional resource use;  and, of course, a host of other
international trade and exchange rate questions endemic  to African nations.
Thus,  I recommend for  the African agricultural economist who will be
in the "eye of the storm" on development issues, more emphasis be placed
on conventional macroeconomic theory, including a thorough grounding in
foreign trade and exchange rate theory.  Further, in addition to price
theory per se,  the African student needs  a thorough understanding of what
the price system does not do,  including conditions under which prices and
markets do not foster efficient resource allocation--public goods,
external costs  and benefits, and monopoly conditions which are likely  to
39exist  in small economies.  These, we remind ourselves, are  the rule,
rather  than the exception for developing countries.
To  forestall charges of  "economic nihilism",  let us  repeat--that
while the price and market system can do much in the way of efficient
resource  allocation, thereby relieving government of decisions best left
to  the market, the task is  to  select that mix of prices and markets, and
government direction, which works, and which  is conducive  to  the all-
important, urgent, and deadly serious task of economic development.  A
thorough knowledge of the theory of price  is necessary, but I strongly
emphasize--far.  far from sufficient for these purposes.
I suspect that similar judgments may hold for  social sciences other
than agricultural economics, as well.
Three  Basic  Questions
In discussing some very general aspects of social  science in Africa,
as  well as  some specific problems, we perhaps raise more questions  than we
answer.  Three questions which are pertinent to  the potential contribution
to economic  development follow.
1.  What constitutes the present  "indigenous cadre" of social
scientists in Kenya and East Africa?  Who are they, where are they
located, in what career stage are they, and are there  "typical"  career
paths  taken?  Certainly, a good portion of them are  in academic
institutions.  Yet, as we have alluded, many have left.  Some are  in
government, and some are  in private firms,  or acting as  private
consultants.  Others are working for  international organizations, and many
more would like  to!  How will those who have left national service be
replaced?  Or, more ominously, will they be replaced?
402.  Is  the required "policy-relevant" research being done?  Or, more
fundamentally, with excessive teaching loads,  is  it possible  for  the
relevant research to be done?  Again, to  re-emphasize the points made by
Ruttan and Weisblat  (footnote 43)  the most useful microeconomic  studies
are  those which contribute to broader macroeconomic questions.  While the
U.S. can afford to use  a portion of its  academic resources for micro studies
oriented toward development of tools,  and to  answering questions having but
tenuous and indirect policy relevance, I assert that Africa cannot.
3.  Following from the preceding question, how can better  links be
forged between the  social science,  and the academic community in general,
and the policy making units  of government?  Certainly, this  is a difficult
question, and one in which expatriates  and donors can probably be of but
limited direct assistance.  Here  again, as  in so many other matters, the
real  thrust must come from within the nation, as  its  processes and
institutions  are developed.  In the meantime, we  should not diminish the
role which the  academic community already plays  in training  future civil
servants.  Yet, the necessity of forging more  effective links between
academic  research and the  policy making units  of government must be of high
priority.
This  list of questions could be expanded indefinitely.  But an
exhaustive  list carries the  risk of obscuring the most  important.  And, I
assert, identifying the  indigenous social science community, ensuring that
they do policy-relevant research, and ensuring that this  reaches  the
relevant arms of government, are among the most urgent tasks  regarding the
indigenous  social science community, and its potential contribution to
economic development.
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The case for building indigenous capacity in the  rural social  sciences
cannot rest on the assurance  that social  scientists will always provide
accurate, correct, timely, and concise solutions  to problems  of developing
nations.  Perhaps the engineer can provide clear cut engineering solutions
to engineering problems.  And perhaps the agricultural scientist can
provide rapid technical advice and prescription.  But  the most intractable
problems of development are social problems, and social  science, by
definition, deals with behavior of people.  Economic development
necessarily involves  the  political, economic, and social organization of
society, and changes thereof.  The traumatic disruption and stress  involved
in such change brings us inexorably to  questions of policy goals, many of
which are conflicting;  alternatives, many of which are controversial;  and
consequences, many of which are neither clear, evident, nor foreseeable.
Quite simply, economic  development deals with people, and as we have noted
throughout, improving the condition of large numbers  of poor people, many
of whom are rural--with their hopes, dreams, aspirations, as well as with
the realty of human faults  and limitations--is obviously quite a different
process than assembling structures  from concrete and steel, or growing
three blades of grass where but two  grew before.
The case for building indigenous capacity in the social sciences must
rest on a more broadly defined basis.  We can start with the value  to
society and the nation of a reservoir of human capital,  an articulate
cadre  of people who are capable of asking appropriate questions, of
defining problems  in such a way that choices and tradeoffs between
conflicting goals can be clarified, that alternatives can be defined, and
42consequences of alternatives by analyzed.  This is  quite different than
providing a "correct" answer to  a specific question posed by a government
agency, but more valuable in the  end.  On such matters  as  agricultural
policy, adoption of technology and its  impact on families, health and
family planning, natural  resource policy, and a host of other development
related issues,  social scientists, using scientific techniques, can answer
carefully worded questions,  and test carefully constructed hypotheses.
While results  of such exercises are valuable in providing a better basis
for social choice, it  is not  realistic  to  expect ultimate  answers.  The
contribution of the social scientist  is  to clarify  the  goals,
alternatives,  and consequences, and in so  far  as possible, provide  the
unbiased information which enables better informed choices.
We note  again that in many African countries, social scientists have
held key posts  in government.  It  is  reasonable to  speculate that many
future leaders  in government, and a large share of people of a growing
middle class,  will have had in their formal education a liberal exposure
to  the social sciences.  One  can take  some measure of comfort  in this,  for
a nation could do worse.
Certainly unique responsibilities and opportunities  exist for
Africans with respect  to policy contributions, public service, and
individual professional development.  These opportunities will doubtlessly
be pursued by the most talented of indigenous  scholars, although they will
require assistance  form the donor  community.  Such opportunities,
especially as  aided by donor organization in the  future,  as  in the  past,
can partially offset the many disadvantages and constraints under which
African social  scientists  labor.
43Finally, a broad brush view such as such  inevitably raises more
questions  than it  answers.  The  three fundamental questions  are:  (1) What
constitutes  the present and future  indigenous cadre of  social scientists
in Kenya and East Africa, and what are  its characteristics?  (2)  What is
their current and future capacity to  contribute  to  the necessary policy-
relevant research? and, (3) What are means of ensuring that the results of
such research get incorporated into  the policy making process?  These are
issues which must be addressed if indigenous  social science  is  to maximize
its  contribution to  economic development.
While the exact role of social science as  a direct catalyst in
economic  development is  debatable, increasing reliance on competent social
science undoubtedly heralds  the  fact that economic development is  indeed
in process.
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